Never before have so many structural changes in the international system occurred simultaneously. Some elements are now global–for example, economics and communications–while politics remains confined to the nation-state or is reduced to ethnic units. To make a long-term difference, the re-elected Clinton administration must envision the world it seeks to achieve. Only in that way will it be able to establish criteria for judging where it is heading.
Let me focus on three areas likely to present the greatest challenges in the next century: Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the transatlantic region encompassing the NATO countries and the territory of the former Soviet bloc.
In Asia, China will emerge as an incipient superpower. When it reaches the per capita income of South Korea (about a third of ours), its GNP will be double that of the United States. Such an eco- nomic colossus is bound to have a major impact. China’s vast mar- ket, reinforced by its growing military power, will, in the hands of skillful and determined leaders, provide a vehicle for growing political influence.
But that does not mean that China will necessarily aim for hegemony. Or that American policy will lose its capacity to affect the evolution of Asia. For one thing, China’s growth will not take place in a vacuum. The end of the bipolar world and the rise of other power centers–in India, Vietnam, China and South Korea–will bring about a more nationalist course in Japan. Less and less convinced that its interests inevitably parallel those of the United States, Japan will emphasize foreign and defense policy more geared to its own national perceptions.
INDIA IS EMERGING AS A MAJOR POWER, ESPECIALLY IN South and Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asian nations, from Vietnam to Myanmar (Burma) and Indonesia, will increase their cohesion. In these conditions, hegemony by any one nation can occur only if all others collapse internally or as a result of a military effort on a scale for which there is as yet no evidence and which, if it occurred, would evoke strong countervailing reactions.
There is a school of thought that proposes trying to anticipate challenges which have not yet occurred by confronting China with human-rights pressures and economic warfare. The theory is that democratization will lead to a more peaceful policy and that economic shortfalls will cut down on China’s military options. Under present circumstances such a policy is certain to fail, while evoking the very dangers with which it seeks to deal. Human-rights pressures against China have failed for the past six years, partly because they reflect a number of misconceptions. China’s foreign policy is not so much driven by communist ideology as by growing nationalism, which can be inflamed only by a confrontational American policy, particularly if we isolate ourselves further by bringing similar pressures on friendly countries like Indonesia. The Chinese economy is not a Stalinist planned system but a self-styled socialist market economy, with the word “market” operationally far more significant than the word “socialist.” Its biggest danger is that it will overheat, not stagnate, as was the case in the Soviet Union. Moreover, Chinese society is already being transformed by indigenous factors, especially the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping. By decentralizing decision making, they have created a kind of pluralism, if not necessarily democracy. Similarly, the impact of the one-child family on historical Chinese social patterns is likely to be profound.
Finally, there is no objective basis in Asia for military con- tainment on the model of the Cold War. The Soviet Union’s European neighbors felt threatened and were eager for visible American military support. By contrast, none of China’s neighbors will be prepared to ground their policy or join an alliance based on the assumption of Chinese aggression. To be sure, they want an American presence, especially in the diplomatic and economic fields, to establish the idea that America is not indifferent to their fate. But, knowing that China is a permanent part of Asia while American commitments are likely to be episodic, they will refuse, short of a direct challenge, to base their policy on hostility to China. A confrontational American policy that is perceived as unprovoked will drive the countries of Asia away from the United States and toward both nationalism and neutralism. Of course, we must not shrink from confrontation if vital American interests or the global equilibrium are challenged. But the stakes are sufficiently high not to prompt a crisis. Chinese diplomacy is more skillful than was that of the Soviet Union; Chinese society is more cohesive, and the neighboring countries are more ambivalent about where the threat to their security lies. For the first time in its history, China is tied to the world economy and a global international system. Before turning to confrontation, a cooperative relationship must be given a chance.
For all these reasons, American policy toward Asia in the next century will need to be based on the following ingredients:
Maintaining good relations with all the countries of the region, to give our diplomacy the greatest possible flexibility. We have no unbridgeable schisms with any of the key countries of Asia; in general, our differences with them are less than each has with its neighbors. We have no interest in dividing Asia into friendly and hostile blocs. Paradoxically, this is the best method of ensuring that we have allies in unavoidable crises.
Continuing the alliance with Japan as the keystone of our Asian security policy. Were it to end or even to weaken, the Japanese trend toward nationalism would be greatly accelerated. At the same time, we must be sensitive to the historic fears of the other Asian nations and conduct the alliance with Japan, in both words and actions, so that it cannot be perceived as a cover for a new wave of Japanese expansionism.
Strengthening the alliance with South Korea to prevent aggression and to develop common positions on unification. The new century will not be very far along before the issue of Korean unification becomes pressing, if indeed it does not happen earlier. The United States will be torn between support of the principle of self-determination and reluctance to face the implications of Northeast Asian instability. Moreover, the views of Ko- rea’s neighbors–especially China and Japan–will be highly am- bivalent. These conflicting motivations are not irreconcilable. But they require a serious dialogue with all the countries concerned; to improvise a resolution after the Korean peninsula has exploded would be far too dangerous.
Establishing a genuine strategic dialogue with China. American policy must not forgo the possibility of political understanding with Beijing. The two countries have a parallel interest in avoiding war in Asia, while China’s disagreements with several of its neighbors are likely to be greater than the ones it has with the United States. Nor will China, for the foreseeable future, have the military strength to undertake a hegemonic policy. All this makes it worth trying to reconcile policies where possible, and to take the sting out of disagreements where it is not.
The Clinton administration’s new emphasis on strategic dialogue with Beijing is to be welcomed. What is lacking is a rationale for this policy. Is it a relabeling of the policy of altering Chinese institutions, or does it mark a genuine shift toward attempting to reconcile perceptions on international affairs? The sudden reversal last March from near-military confrontation to the announcement of three high-level visits runs the risks of being construed as a largely tactical maneuver in China and of confusing the other capitals of Asia. The effectiveness of the dialogue will depend on its content. It needs to be based on a precise and detailed analysis of Asian trends and of the means to distill parallel approaches or to soften the impact of disagreements.
DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST TEND TO focus almost exclusively on the Arab-Israeli issue. While it is demonstrably explosive, there exists an established and tested framework for dealing with it. Below the surface of the Gulf, however, lurk even more dangerous structural issues. There, states of very limited power possess the capacity to cause nearly infinite international damage. When, in 1973, the Gulf states found themselves in a position to raise oil prices by 387 percent in a three-month period, they triggered a 10-year finan-cial and economic crisis that threatened the global economic and financial systems and undermined the governability of the industrial democracies.
Today the consequences of a crisis in the Gulf are no less ominous. But the structure on which its stability depends is even more brittle. The two strongest nations–Iran and Iraq–are outlaw states. The United States has imposed sanctions on Iran; the international community, on Iraq. The immediate area contains only two friendly Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. But Saudi Arabia is going through the torments of adapting an essentially feudal society to the modernization wrought by oil resources, global communications and the spread of education. Jordan, bordering Iraq, Syria and Israel, has its hands full with its own immediate security concerns.
Turkey, though somewhat removed geographically, is central to Gulf strategy. Looking toward Iran and Iraq on one set of frontiers and toward Europe on another, Turkey has been the anchor of our Mediterranean policy. But it feels rejected by decades of American and European pressure over its policies on Cyprus and the Kurds. And there is a real danger that its fundamentalists might win a democratic election, reversing the Ataturk reforms and reorienting Turkey toward the Islamic world.
IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SUSTAIN THE STABILITY OF the Gulf indefinitely without the effective support of Turkey. Nor will it be possible to maintain international support for the Iraqi sanctions very far into the new millennium, if indeed until then. A policy of keeping Iraq united as a potential obstacle to Iran conflicts with the goal of fostering the autonomy of the Kurds in the north and of the Shiites around Basra by means of no-fly zones and similar measures. U.S. policy has already suffered a shipwreck in the Kurdish area, and with the passage of time the inconsistencies in our position will become even more apparent.
To seek stability in the Gulf against both Iran and Iraq simultaneously, with vulnerable Saudi Arabia our only ally, is a high-risk policy. But breaking out of this dilemma is not easy. Dealing with Saddam Hussein presents insuperable problems; Iran would be the logical candidate for a rapprochement, but so far there has not been a shred of evidence that Iran is prepared to abandon its support for terrorism.
Fortunately, there are no comparable obstacles in dealing constructively with Turkey. It is high time to treat Turkey in a manner compatible with its strategic importance. There is an urgent need for such a new emphasis before a fundamentalist victory in Turkey removes the option.
But if we can find no way to modify the building blocks in the Persian Gulf, we had better prepare ourselves for an inevitable blow-up. The new Clinton foreign-policy team has no more urgent task than to assemble the best minds it can find to devise an appropriate response to an explosion in the Gulf or an upheaval in Saudi Arabia. These are crises that cannot possibly be dealt with by improvisation.
Three events will shape transatlantic relations in the next century: the success or failure of the attempt by the European Union to constitute itself as a political entity; the rise of Russia, and the Atlantic policy of the United States.
By the beginning of the new millennium, the European currency–the Euro–will have come into existence for France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, with Italy and Spain joining either from the beginning or within two years. The question is less whether the founders can meet the agreed criteria for fiscal discipline than whether they will be able to maintain it afterward. There are two possibilities: that the inability to maintain fiscal discipline will set off an inflationary spiral, or that the effort to impose austerity by means of a European Central Bank will trigger a political backlash. Either of these contingencies will condemn Europe to years of discord and division and will reduce its international role.
The more favorable prospect is that the Euro succeeds and that, despite all doubts, a common fiscal and monetary policy will help overcome Europe’s economic sclerosis. In that case, Europe, with its competitiveness restored, will transform the Euro into a new reserve currency as bond managers around the world use it to hedge their dollar investments. For America, this will be an unprecedented situation, which could set off economic warfare unless statesmanship on both sides of the Atlantic manages to devise new attitudes and institutions for cooperation.
The return of Russia to a major international role will be another seminal event. Early in the new century, after many ups and downs, Russia is likely to have restored its central authority. It may well be closer to the political structures favored by Pinochet or Salazar than to a Western pluralistic system–though it will be freer than Communism. Once a legal system is established and a measure of predictability introduced, the economy should recover as well.
At that point, the nations bordering the Atlantic will have to get used to a far more assertive Russia. The task of the Atlantic Alliance will become to give Russia an opportunity to participate fully in the political constructions of the new millennium, while ensuring that its traditional nationalism does not spill across its borders.
The enlargement of NATO to include the former Soviet satellites in Central Europe can provide the essential safety net for this task. At the same time a body for political cooperation embracing the key members of the Atlantic Alliance plus Russia must also be created. The appropriate forum for this is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Charging NATO with both tasks waters down the Alliance and invites long-term Russian pressure.
Key members of the Clinton administration–whose formative experience was the Vietnam protest–consider the Cold War to have been at least partially provoked by the United States. Treating Russia as a psychological problem, they have tried to placate Moscow by enlarging NATO in a way that transforms it from military alliance into a political forum which, for all practical purposes, includes Russia. This would destroy NATO as a safety net and invite permanent Russian intrusion into the heart of Alliance decision-making.
Whatever my doubts about the suitability of economic sanctions for spreading democracy in Asia, I consider it essential to promote the democratic ideal by fostering close cooperation where it already exists, especially among the nations bordering the Atlantic and within the Western Hemisphere. Military conflict among these nations is nearly inconceivable. It is among the established democracies that we should reinforce the values and institutions we treasure. The Western Hemisphere Economic Free Trade Area proposed by President Clinton and its ultimate merging into an Atlantic Free Trade Area are crucial steps toward realizing these goals.
The American foreign policy challenge for the next millennium is different from anything in our previous experience. Heretofore we engaged ourselves internationally by dealing with problems that were seen as having a terminal date. In the period ahead our biggest challenge will be to help construct a system in which the rewards and penalties are conducive to a broader sense of global well-being. But one imperative has not changed since the days of the Cold War: a peaceful and humane international order in the next century requires firm and enlightened American leadership buttressed by bipartisan support.
PHOTO (COLOR): CHINA: This vast market is now tied to the world economy. We must establish a genuine strategic dialogue.
PHOTO (COLOR): RUSSIA: Early in the new century, it will have restored its central authority–but the new structure will be far freer than communism
PHOTO (COLOR): PARADE IN TEHRAN: Our problem is that the Gulf’s two strongest nations are outlaws
A CHINESE LAND GRAB
DISPATCHES FROM THE FUTURE
April 2, 2005 Beijing sent lightly armed police units into the Russian Far East today to protect Chinese residents whose ownership of huge tracts of Russian land made them targets of angry mobs. “China will protect its citizens, wherever they are,” said President Li Peng.
Russia reacted furiously. President Aleksandr Lebed called China’s police action “a creeping annexation of Russian land.” He ordered his army to expel the 2 million Chinese who live in the rich but undeveloped region south of Khabarovsk (map). But it wasn’t clear whether Russian troops would carry out the order. Many units of Russia’s demoralized army earn most of their income by working for Chinese industries in the area.
Most of the Chinese settlers are undocumented aliens who settled in Russia’s Maritime Territory to exploit its timber, fish and minerals. Local officials have been complaining for years about the growth of “Chinatowns” in the Russian Far East. And the Chinese have begun to refer to the area, only half jokingly, as “Beihai Sheng” (North Coast province).
With Asia facing its most dangerous crisis since the Second Korean War six years ago, United Nations Secretary-General Mary Robinson urged the Security Council to intervene. But diplomats said any action would be vetoed by three permanent members of the council: Brazil, India and China itself. In Washington, President Kasich discussed the crisis at a midnight meeting with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Sources said Washington would try to mediate the dispute through a special envoy, probably the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Al Gore.
No one knows what will happen if the Russians decide to fight. Li’s control of his government is still wobbly, after last year’s unpopular overthrow of former president Jiang Zemin. Li may not have enough authority, on his own, to launch an all-out war against another nuclear power. Such decisions are still approved, in private, by China’s paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, 102, who has not been seen in public in the last 11 years.
