Last week NEWSWEEK’s Marcus Mabry spoke with three leading Arab intellectuals–based in Amman, Beirut and Damascus–to get their views. All three believed that the chances of the rising violence in Israel and the territories escalating into a wider, regional conflict are virtually nil, particularly given Israel’s overwhelming military might. They also unanimously defended Yasir Arafat’s rejection of the deal offered by former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak at Camp David last year, arguing that no Arab leader could have agreed to a peace plan that did not include significant Arab control of East Jerusalem–even if, in hindsight, Arafat’s rejection of the offer may have contributed to Sharon’s landslide victory in Israeli elections earlier this month. More excerpts:
Rami G. Khouri Former editor, The Jordan Times We should explore a partial peace agreement more vigorously. So much progress has been made, it’s a historical and moral imperative for the Palestinians and the Israelis to sign off on what can be agreed to now–but only if we can have an iron-clad, internationally guaranteed agreement that the refugee issue will be addressed at a later date. (Jerusalem can be solved; each side gets its religious sites.) I’m concerned that if we hold out for everything, we’ll end up getting nothing… [In the meantime] you cannot achieve peace through the use of force. Sharon has already tried every hard-line, macho move in the past. I don’t see him lasting that long: three to six months. The inevitable reality will set in for the Israeli people that he is a manifestation of people’s fears and not a way to end them. In Jordan, King Abdullah will have to keep in mind that any development between the Israelis and Palestinians will have an immediate impact here [where half the population is Palestinian]. Traditionally the leadership has been careful to make sure Palestinian reaction to events is not violent. This is a particularly dangerous issue.
Sadik J. Al-Azm Professor emeritus, Damascus University Some Arabs are actually gleeful that Sharon has come to power–the Germans call it schadenfreude. Hard-liners think this is positive: the Israelis being pushed so hard that they bring back a basically discredited figure. Moderates are divided souls. The hard-liners push them one way. But in Syria, the desire to get back the Golan pulls them in another… Syria’s leaders want to see what signs come from Sharon. Will he behave like Menachem Begin [also a conservative] and make the Israelis swallow the necessary sacrifices for peace? If he does, then I think there will be a return to the peace process–on all the tracks. But if he goes back to his old stand of never giving up the Golan, Syria will return to the weapons of the weak: support of Hizbullah, Hamas and the extremists, greater solidarity with Iraq and Iran… I’m convinced no one in the region wants war, including Sharon. Had Israel not pulled out of Lebanon the chance of war would be much greater. Hizbullah would have continued its attacks and, with Sharon in power, you don’t know how he would have reacted. Now it’s quiet in Lebanon. No one–except Hizbullah–wants to stir the pot.
Farid el Khazen Professor, American University of Beirut For all parties Camp David was a no-win situation. Neither side was in a position to deliver what the other expected. And had there been a “deal,” Sharon would have gotten even more votes in the election. [Now] it’s not Arab leaders who will get tougher with Sharon; it’s the other way around… In Lebanon, Sharon will not opt for a massive war similar to that of 1982. But he can attack Lebanon and Syrian targets in Lebanon, destroying infrastructure and killing civilians. Lebanese leaders–subject to pressure from Syria–won’t have to prove to the Lebanese people that they are “tough” in the face of Sharon. They will have to prove they are in control of the country… South Lebanon continues to be a proxy battlefield for Syria while the latter abides by the ceasefire in the Golan Heights. Sharon will give Syria and the pro-Syrian government in Beirut another pretext to strengthen “coordination,” which requires, among other things, the silencing of an increasingly vocal Lebanese opposition to the Syrian military presence in Lebanon.
